THE RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY 

in- its struggle against the 

Bolshevist Tyranny 



By COL. VLADIMIR I. LEBEDEFF 

Former Secretary of Navy in the Russian 
Provisional Government and Member of 
the All-Russian Constituent Assembly 



Second Edition 
Price 35 Cents 



PUBLISHED BY THE 

Russian Information Bureau in the U. S. 

WOOLWORTH BUILDING 
NEW YORK CITY 



r 




The Russian Democracy 

in its struggle against the 

Bolshevist Tyranny 



By COL. VLADIMIR I. LEBEDEFF 

Former Secretaiy of Navy in the Russian 
Provisional Government and Member of 
the All-Russian Constituent Assembly 




PUBLISHED BY THE 

Russian Information Bureau in the U. S. 

WOOLWORTH BUILDING 
NEW YORK CITY 




Gift 
Publisher 
AUG H Bts 



Introduction 



The author of this pamphlet, Colonel Vladimir I. Lebedeff, 
is the former Secretary of the Navy in the Russian Provi- 
sional Government and one of the leaders of the Party of 
Socialists-Revolutionists in Russia. Several weeks ago Col. 
Lebedeff visited this country, sent by the Congress of Ufa 
on a special mission to enlist the sympathies of the American 
democracy for the movement of the Russian people against 
Bolshevism. 

Col. Lebedeff was at the head of the Russian troops who 
fought for months on the Volga front, together with the Cze- 
cho-Slovaks, holding the line against the Bolsheviki. Deprived 
of the aid of the Allies, which these Russian forces had been 
led to expect, they have been compelled to retreat, and to-day 
not only Russia, but entire Europe is menaced by the Bolshe- 
vist danger. 

Colonel Lebedeff's life-story is very interesting. Upon 
completing his military education, he entered the Russian 
Army as an officer, and participated in the Russo-Japanese 
War. During this campaign he was severely wounded and 
decorated for bravery. The impressions of the Russo-Japanese 
War made the young officer join the Russian revolutionary 
movement, and soon after his return from the battle-fields, 
because of the persecution of the Tzar's government, he was 
obliged to escape abroad. 

The beginning of the War, in 1914, found Col. Lebedeff in 
Paris. Together with other Russian political leaders, he im- 
mediately undersood that the victory of German militarism 
would endanger democratic institutions throughout the world. 
Just as George Plekhanov, Nicholas Avksentiev and other pro- 
minent Russian socialist leaders, Col. Lebedeff, at the very 
beginning of the war, declared himself a supporter of the Allies, 
and accompanied by many Russian political immigrants in 
France entered the French Army as a private soldier. He fought 



on the French and Macedonian fronts for two and a half 
years, up to the moment of the March Revolution in Russia. 
He was wounded several times, was decorated with the Croix 
de Guerre, and was promoted to the rank of officer. After 
the March Revolution of 1917, Colonel Lebedeff went back to 
Russia and was invited. to enter the Provisional Government as 
Secretary of the Navy. 

Accepting the post, Colonel Lebedeff immediately took 
strict measures for reestablishing discipline in the Russian 
Fleet. In July, 1917, he was at the head of the forces which 
suppressed the Bolshevist revolt. Shortly after that Colonel 
Lebedeff left the Cabinet because the Provisional Government 
would not consent to his program of immediate strict measures 
against Bolshevism. After leaving the Cabinet, Colonel Lebe- 
deff cooperated with the "Grandmother of the Russian Revo- 
lution," Catherine Breshkovskaya, in editing a revolutionary 
and patriotic daily, "Volia Naroda" (The Will of the People). 

In June of 1918 the Colonel entered a new Ministry, 
organized on the Volga by the Committee of the Con- 
stituent Assembly. It was as a member of this Ministry that he 
organized the detachments known as the Russian People's 
Army, which have made such a notable stand against the Bol- 
shevist and the German elements. Acting in cooperation with 
the Czecho-Slovaks, the detachments of the People's Army 
took Syzran, Samara, Simbirsk, Kazan and other important 
cities on the Volga. In Kazan the forces under Colonel 
Lebedeff took possession of 800,000,000 roubles in gold 
(about $400,000,000) —two-thirds of Russia's gold reserve. 
This vast sum had been in the possession of the Bolsheviki, 
and part of this gold would have been transferred to Germany 
in accordance with the supplementary terms of the Brest- 
Litovsk Treaty. At the same time these forces, under Colonel 
Lebedeff, captured a large quantity of silver, securities and 
other valuables, all of which was forwarded by the Colonel to 
the Directorate of Five, chosen at the Congress of Ufa, and 
at that time sitting in Omsk. 

Colonel Lebedeff's story of the struggle of the Russian de- 
mocrats and patriots against the Bolshevist and German for- 
ces on the Volga front presents a page of the Russian Revolu- 
tion thus far almost unknown in this country. This story is 



not only of temporary importance as material that may help 
in an understanding of the Russian problem as it stands to-day, 
but it will undoubtedly survive as an historical document im- 
portant for all who study the Russian Revolution.* 



A. J. SACK 
Director of the Russian Information 
Bureau in the U. S. 

May 14, 1919. 



* At the end of the pamphlet the readers will find a map representing 
Siberia and European Russia. The red line extending from Vladivostok to 
Kazan shows the length of the Front defended by the Russian patriots and the 
Czecho-Slovaks against the Bolshevist-German forces. All the important cities 
mentioned in the pamphlet are marked on this map. 



The Russian Democracy 

in its struggle against the 

Bolshevist Tyranny 

By 

COL. VLADIMIR I. LEBEDEFF 
Former Secretary of Navy in the Russian Provisional Government 
and Member of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly 

I 

THE nation-wide democratic movement against the Bol- 
shevist tyranny in Russia began in April, 1918, when 
the majority of the Russian people recognized that 
Bolshevism threatened Russia with destruction and began 
openly to rise against the Bolsheviki. In fact, the people had 
realized this long ago and outbreaks had occurred here and 
there. However, there was no such strong anti-Bolshevist 
movement as that which began at this time. This movement 
began among the workingmen, the element that had given 
the main support to the Bolsheviki in their struggle for 
ascendancy. 

In the spring of 1918, the workingmen of Petrograd rose in 
masses in open protest against the rule of the Soviets and the 
Bolshevist Commissaries. At that time the plants in Petrograd 
were going through a severe crisis due to the fact that the 
Bolshevist order had destroyed the very foundation of or- 
ganized industry. Moreover, the occupation of the southern 
provinces, the Donetz coal region and the Ukraine, by the 
Germans, had cut off all supplies of food as well as of 
raw materials, without which the plants could not continue 
operations. The workingmen, mainly unenlightened peasants 
who had come to the city for the period of the war and had 
no common interests with the organized labor class, rushed 
back to their villages. 



8 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



In Petrograd, however, there remained the more efficient and 
more enlightened of the Russian proletariat, whose existence 
is closely connected with organized industry. Out of more 
than 400,000 workingmen, the total of the working population 
during the war, about 132,000 had remained. Of these about 
100,000 had no confidence in the rule of the Soviets. Neither 
had the sailors on board the mine-sweepers on the Neva River 
any confidence in the Soviets. These sailors soon awoke to the 
fact that Bolshevism threatened not only the integrity of Rus- 
sia, but also that of the remainder of the Russian fleet which 
had escaped destruction. The sailors in Petrograd repeatedly 
demanded the resignation of the Soviet Commissaries; they 
even worked for an organized resistance, together with other 
elements opposed to the Soviets. The workingmen, due to the 
Bolshevist methods, could not protest in the same institution 
which, so to say, represented them, i. e., in the Council of 
Workingmen's Deputies. Therefore, at the general reelection 
to the Soviet they worked for a unanimous refusal to send 
their delegates to the Soviet, but failed due to the Bolshevist 
election methods. The Soviet, despite its short existence, has 
contrived devices which excel all those of any arch-bourgeois 
country. The workingmen then decided to establish a new 
organization, side by side with the Soviet. 

In April, 1918, they summoned the so-called "Conference of 
Representatives of Factory Workers of the City of Petrograd 
and Vicinity." This conference consisted of more than 100,000 
workingmen out of a total of 132,000 workingmen in Petro- 
grad at that time. The conference was marked by heated 
disputes. In spite of all the efforts of the Bolsheviki, a 
resolution was adopted and published in the form of an 
appeal to the people of Russia. This appeal pictured in 
vivid colors the calamity that has befallen the country and 
the harm wrought by the Soviets of the People's Commissaries 
and the Bolshevist government- 

This proclamation, written in a clear and beautiful style, was 
the cry of the soul of a despairing, betrayed people. It pointed 
out that the Bolsheviki promised a general democratic peace, 
instead of which they have brought upon the Russian people 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



9 



humiliation and disgrace by the Brest-Litovsk treaty and the 
most cruel civil war waged on innumerable fronts within 
the country; they promised the people bread and have brought 
hunger instead; they promised liberty and have established 
a most cruel arbitrary power; they have abolished freedom of 
speech, assembly, and personal liberty; they promised the 
people to honorably convoke a Constituent Assembly, 
but instead have suppressed all manifestations of self-govern- 
ment and democracy by dispersing all the self-governing 
bodies, the Zemstvos and Municipalities. The proclama- 
tion called upon the people to act in unison and concluded 
with the demand for the immediate resignation of the 
Soviets and the transmission of power to the Constituent 
Assembly. The conference elected a special delegation to 
the workingmen of Moscow, in order that Moscow might 
start a similar movement. This delegation arrived in Mos- 
cow in May, 1918. Among the workingmen of Moscow, 
roused anyhow, a strong agitation began which resulted in 
the calling of a conference similar to the one in Petrograd. 
The Bolshevist authorities sought to arrest the delegation, but 
were forced by the workingmen of Moscow to give up their 
undertaking. 

At the same time there also appeared an appeal from the 
railroad-men, which pointed to the fact that the railroads 
would soon have to stop operations if the existing government 
remained in power. The railroad-men also demanded the 
transmission of governing power to the Constituent Assembly 
and the resignation of the Soviets of the People's Commis- 
saries. Simultaneously disorders broke out in many other 
cities. In Kolpino the Bolsheviki had to shoot down groups 
of workingmen. There were similar happenings in Sormovo, 
near Nisjni-Novgorod. 

In the meantime disturbances occurred among the starving 
peasants of Central Russia, whose food supply from the 
Ukraine and other provinces having bread in abundance was 
cut off. Disorders occurred in many other provinces, namely, 
in Smolensk, Voronezh, Tver, Tambov, Riazin, and Moscow. 
Soldiers who had returned from the front revolted in Samara 



10 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



and Saratov and in other cities along the Volga. In Samara 
and Saratov the mutineers succeeded in seizing power for a 
few days, but, due to the fact that the revolt was not 
organized but rather spontaneous, the Bolsheviki succeeded 
in suppressing it without much effort. The Union of the 
so-called Soldiers-from-the-Front consisted mainly of soldiers 
born in provinces occupied by the Germans. After the con- 
clusion of the Brest-Litovsk treaty they had refused to disarm 
and had formed a union under the pretext of performing 
neutral guard duty, mainly in the cities along the Volga. The 
Bolsheviki, not desiring to come into conflict with them, had 
permitted them to remain in the service. On every suitable 
occasion these soldiers revolted. 

In a number of cities a strong agitation began among the 
very Red Army. It is a well-known fact that the Bolsheviki 
regarded with great distrust the same armed forces whose 
protection they had formerly sought. The November revo- 
lution in Petrograd, for instance, was brought about by sailors 
and some regiments of the Petrograd Guard. A few weeks 
later these regiments, to whom the Brest-Litovsk treaty 
seemed a disgrace, were disarmed. The first quota of the Red 
Guard, consisting of enlightened workmen, disbanded of 
their own will. The others, in turn, were disarmed by 
the Bolsheviki, and the Red Guard was turned into a Red 
Army. Many divisions of the Red Army were likewise dis- 
armed. Sailors serving on mine-sweepers were also dis- 
banded. Finally the Bolsheviki formed a hired army of a 
peculiar kind; it was an army composed of war prisoners, 
mainly Hungarians and Chinese formerly employed by the 
Murmansk Railroad; of Lettish detachments, almost all of 
whom joined the Bolsheviki, and of the dregs of the popula- 
tion, lured by the high salaries paid them by the Soviets, the 
light work in the service, the privileges, and mainly by the 
prospect of being well fed, for at that time all of Central 
Russia was starving. Only the Soviets and the Red Army 
lived lavishly and sumptuously on good rations. 

Besides the above-mentioned elements, the intellectuals also 
fought the Bolsheviki. All the political parties were opposed to 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



11 



the Bolsheviki : the Social-Democrats Mensheviki, the Social- 
ists-Revolutionists, the Socialists-Populists and the Cadets. 
Only the left wing of the Socialists-Revolutionists cooperated 
with the Bolsheviki. 

At that time a bloc was formed destined to play a very 
important part in the history of Russia's revival. This so- 
called "Union for Russia's Resurrection" was composed of 
members of the centre and left wing of the Constitutional- 
Democrats, the right wing of the Party of Socialists-Revolu- 
tionists, the Party of Socialists-Populists, Plekhanov's group, 
"Unity", and all other non-partisan democratic elements, of 
whom General Bolduirev is one of the most talented repre- 
sentatives. This new political body, which synbolized the 
union of the leading elements of Russia's political life, started 
official negotiations with the Allies planning to restore an 
Allied front in Russia, to war against Germany and against 
those who had interfered with this war and had concluded 
the disgraceful Brest-Litovsk treaty. 

Besides the Union for the Resurrection of Russia, with mem- 
bers all over Central Russia, there were other new organiza- 
tions, such as the National Centre, which drew its membership 
from the more conservative elements. These groups, as far as 
I know, also had official connections with the Allies. More- 
over, every large city in Russia had formed non-partisan or- 
ganizations of army officers, who were preparing for an open 
struggle against the Bolsheviki. The majority of these non- 
partisan officers' organizations worked hand in hand with the 
Socialists-Revolutionists, upon which party had been forced 
the status of an illegal organization. One part of these 
officers' organizations had as its leader B. V. Savinkov, former 
Minister of War in the Kerensky Cabinet. He also was in 
constant touch with representatives of the Allies. 

At the end of May, 1918, the Socialists-Revolutionists held 
a conference. The Bolsheviki ordered the arrest of the entire 
body. However, most of its members escaped. This confer- 
ence adopted a resolution declaring that it was necessary 
to openly declare war against the Bolshevist Government, 
to transfer full power to the Constituent Assembly, to annul 



12 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and to restore an Allied front in 
Russia. Soon afterwards the Constitutional-Democrats also 
met and adopted a similar resolution. Thus at the end of 
May, Russia was fully prepared to begin the struggle against 
the Bolsheviki, but the country was unorganized, without am- 
munition, and under the terror of the Bolsheviki, who had 
mercenary troops. 

Everybody saw clearly that the Bolshevist power could 
not last long, but some stimulus from without, an external 
propelling force was necessary to help form a National 
force. Such assistance could have been given by the 
Cossacks of the Ural region who had been fighting the 
Bolsheviki at home for three months ; or the army of 
Gen. Alexeiev, stationed in the South; or the Allied troops, 
who, according to representatives of the Allies, were daily 
expected to land in Vladivostok and Archangel. A successful 
revolt somewhere away from the political center might also 
have led to the formation of such a national force. Such a revolt 
was expected to take place successfully in the Volga region, 
for right in back of the mutineers would have been the Cos- 
sacks of the Ural and Orenburg. The Cossacks of the Ural 
Mountains were splendid types for a movement of this kind. 
Democratic in their habits and relations, they had been suc- 
cessfully fighting the Bolsheviki for more than three months. 

The situation in the Urals, at that time, will be best under- 
stood if we state that mobilization had partly begun (a general 
mobilization had been planned but could not be realized on ac- 
count of lack of ammunition) • loans were oversubscribed by 
the people, and at the head of the movement there was a 
united government. Just at that time all political factions 
opposed to the Bolsheviki, including the Socialists-Revolu- 
tionists, had decided to concentrate their forces in the Volga 
region and to transport there all officers' and volunteer organ- 
izations for the purpose of warring against the Bolsheviki. 
The Allies were informed of it, and together with representa- 
tives of the above organizations worked out a plan for creating 
a new front ilong the Volga. This was supposed to be the 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



13 



basis for further operations against Germany and her ally, 
i. e., the Soviet authorities. 

II 

At the end of May I was sent to the Volga region and 
further down to Uralsk as a special representative of the 
anti-Bolshevist forces, to organize the struggle. Right then 
the first encounter between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Red 
Army took place, in Penza and Rtischevo. It was a result of 
Trotzky's famous order to disarm the Czecho-Slovaks and to 
bar their way to Vladivostok. On June 8, the Czecho-Slovak 
. units approached Samara. In spite of Trotzky's order and the 
opposition of the local Soviet, the workingmen of Syzran 
decided to let the Czecho-Slovaks pass. Part of the units 
proceeded to Samara. The majority of the Czecho-Slovaks 
had reached Ufa when a new order came from Trotsky: by 
all means to stop them in their march onward. 

The headquarters of the so-called Ural-Orenburg front 
was in Samara, and a force of about 8,000 soldiers stationed 
there met the Czecho-Slovaks in order to bar the way of 
their units under the command of Col. Chechek. These 
units consisted of the 1st and 4th regiments and the reserves 
of the Czecho-Slovaks. In Samara there was also a pretty 
powerful organization of non-partisan officers headed by 
Colonel Galkin. This organization was in close touch with 
the local organization of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionists, 
which was headed by five members of the Constituent 
Assembly who happened to be in Samara. These were Volsky, 
Brushvit, Klimushkin, Nesterov and Fortunatov. At the time 
when the Czecho-Slovaks were fighting near Samara, against 
the Soviet army, superior in number, in the supply of am- 
munitions and artillery equipment, the two above-named or- 
ganizations revolted in Samara. Thus, due to the efforts of 
the Czecho-Slovaks and the Russian forces, the Soviet power 
in Samara was crushed. 

Tribute must be paid to the Czecho-Slovaks who have 
smashed the best Bolshevist troops, including the Naval 
Battalion, which was well supplied with machine-guns and 



14 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



artillery, while the Czecho-Slovaks had neither. The Soviet 
power was overthrown in Samara on June 8, and the same 
day the formation of a new government and a new army 
began. By a unanimous decision of all political parties and 
social organizations, the governing-power was entrusted to 
the members of the Constituent Assembly, who formed a 
Committee of Members of the All-Russian Constituent As- 
sembly, with the understanding that all other members who 
might arrive in Samara would automatically become mem- 
bers of the new Government. Exception was made in 
the case of members of the Constituent Assembly elected by 
the Bolsheviki and the left wing of the Socialists-Revolution- 
ists. These parties were declared traitors by the Committee 
of Members of the Constitutient Assembly. 

The new army was organized on the following basis: 
Voluntary enlistments were for a period of three months. The 
salary of officers and soldiers was an insignificant one; it 
amounted to fifteen rubles a month with board. This item is 
very important, for it testifies to the patriotism and honesty 
of those who at that critical moment entered the army, which 
was practically surrounded by the forces of the Bolsheviki who 
literally bought the souls of their soldiers with enormously 
high salaries. The discipline of the new army was strict. It 
demanded unquestioned obedience and court-martial for those 
guilty of disobedience. No committees or commissaries were 
allowed. 

The formation of this army began on June 8, and on June 
15, with the help of a company of Czecho-Slovaks, the city of 
Stavropol was taken from the enemy. With the seizure of 
Stavropol, a large region along the Volga and part of the 
river came into the hands of the new Government. 

Soon after the formation of the army a military flotilla 
was formed, composed of armored tows. The tows were 
equipped with 3-inch guns and machine-guns. These tows 
participated in the battles near Stavropol. 

Meanwhile the units of the Czecho-Slovaks and the new 
army, called "People's Army," in the sense of National Army, 
continued to advance in all directions, towards the Ural to 
join the Ural Cossacks ; towards Buzuluk to join the Cossacks 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



15 



of Orenburg-, and to Ufa, to join the Czecho-Slovaks and to 
help them repel the Bolshevist forces. 

On June 15, or 16, the Bolsheviki left Syzran because of 
rumors that the Czecho-Slovaks and the People's Army were 
advancing in the direction of the city. Despite the superiority 
of their armed forces, the Soviet authorities of Syzran began 
to prepare for evacuation, and one morning left the city in a 
panic which was perfectly unfounded. It is true that the posi- 
tion of the Soviet power in Syzran was rather a difficult one, 
for the workmen of Syzran, particularly the railroad-men, were 
hostile towards it. As I have said before, the pressure 
brought to bear by the workingmen had compelled the Soviet 
to let the Czecho-Slovaks pass Syzran, even while the Soviet 
was still in power there. The Soviet authorities, literally com- 
posed of criminals, decided to take revenge for the working- 
men's intervention. They arrested twenty-three of the most 
prominent workingmen, as well as the presidents of the labor 
and railroad unions in Syzran. The day before the Soviet left 
the city, the twenty-three men were transferred from the 
prison to a small wine-cellar, 5 steps long and 5 steps wide, and 
there they were shot. As the Soviet soldiers refused to commit 
this unjustifiable murder, the president of the "revolutionary" 
Soviet, EmelianofF, the commissary of justice, Lazda, some 
member of the revolutionary tribunal by the name of Kon- 
trimovich, and Commissary Froloff, assisted by two Hun- 
garians, fired at these defenseless people. Six of the twenty- 
three condemned men were severely wounded, but escaped 
death because they were buried under the seventeen bodies of 
their fallen comrades. 

You can readily imagine how this brutal murder terrified 
and infuriated the workingmen. When the Soviet authorities, 
who had fled, were ordered to return to Syzran, the working- 
men, railroad-men, and the rest of the population, armed with 
whatever they happened to come across, met the Soviet troops 
outside of the city walls with such resistance that they had 
to retreat. The people of Syzran immediately sent a delegation 
to Samara asking for representatives of the New Government 
and for military help. The New Government sent me as the 



16 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



representative of the War Department, entrusting me with 
unrestricted civil and military authority. At the same time a 
small armed force, consisting of one company of Czecho- 
slovaks and two companies of the People's Army, was sent 
there. We could not afford to send a greater force as we had 
to fight, as I have said before, on several fronts. The popula- 
tion of Syzran gave us a very hearty welcome. The work- 
ingmen as well as the wealthy classes of the population gladly 
sacrificed for us whatever they could, and 550,000 rubles was 
collected for the People's Army. Many volunteered for service. 
The railroad-men formed special railroad units, which, how- 
ever, lacked stability due to their deficient organization. 

We had in Syzran about 400 thoroughly disciplined men at 
the time when the Bolsheviki had ordered out for the recap- 
ture of Syzran 4,000 men under the leadership of the famous 
Colonel Mouraviev, Commander-in-Chief of all the Bolshevist 
armies, who had taken and destroyed Odessa, Kiev, and 
other cities of Southern Russia, and who had headed the 
Bolshevist troops during the November revolution. The Bol- 
shevist troops, composed mainly of Hungarians, Chinese, 
Letts, and a comparatively small number of Russians of the 
Red Army, were well equipped with artillery, which we lacked 
almost completely. The Bolshevist troops, whose fighting 
power was ten times as great as ours, attacked our small 
units, who had formed outposts for the defense of railways 
and roads so as to prevent the destruction of the city by the 
enemy's heavy artillery. Naturally, for lack of fortifications, 
our men were frequently exposed to the artillery fire and had 
to retreat towards Syzran. This situation lasted for fourteen 
days and exhausted our forces. 

That was the time our forces united with the Orenburg Cos- 
sacks, who had their own front in Orsk and Aktubinsk, and 
with the Ural Cossacks, who also had their own front in the 
Urals. In addition, a new front was formed south of 
Samara, the Nikolayevsk front, not mentioning the front at 
Stavropol. At this same time, Ufa fell. This happened in 
the following way. The Bolshevist forces in Ufa were headed 
by Col. Makhin, of the General Staff, a native of Orenburg, 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



17 



who, with the consent of the Central Committee of the Social- 
ists-Revolutionists, had accepted the appointment of the Bol- 
sheviki in order to disorganize the Bolshevist army and to 
bring about its defeat at a suitable moment. Therefore, when 
the Czecho-Slovaks approached Ufa, Col. Makhin and his staff, 
having previously disorganized the defending forces of Ufa, 
disappeared, and the Bolshevist troops, left without a com- 
mander at the most critical moment, had to abandon the city. 
This natural fortress, situated on a mountain and protected 
by the waters of the Begai River, fell without resistance. 
Thus in the beginning of July, a considerable territory on 
the left bank of the Volga was freed from the Soviets. Simul- 
taneously several new fronts and new anti-Bolshiviki armies 
were created, which were in need of a unified command. 

The following forces had fought on the liberated territory: 
the People's Army, the Czecho-Slovak units, the Cossacks of 
Orenburg and the Ural. This territory accepted the government 
of the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly; 
the Cossacks, however, retained autonomy in their domestic 
affairs. It was decided to put a Czecho-Slovak officer at the 
head of the armed forces because the Czecho-Slovaks were the 
best organized troops and enjo) r ed great popularity and the 
love of the people. Colonel Chechek, of the 1st Hussite Divi- 
sion of the Czechs, later Major-General, was elected to the 
post. A Ministry of War was organized, directed by Colonel 
Galkin with two assistants, Vzorov and myself. In view of 
the fact that it was feared that voluntary enlistments might 
not bring about the desired results, and the population pre- 
ferred mobilization, it was decided to declare a mobilization. 
On July 5th a decree was issued calling to the colors all those 
born in 1897 and 1898. 

Because of the critical situation in Syzran, I sent out calls on 
July 3, so that the mobilization might be an accomplished fact 
by July 6. The population answered the call with enthusiasm 
and in the evening of July 6, all the mobilized forces of Syzran 
were in their barracks. On July 7, after preliminary drilling, 
they were sent to the front. The same evening our fatigued 
units had to retreat to the city and we had to solve the 



18 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



dilemma of either fighting the enemy within Syzran or 
leaving the city in the hands of the Bolsheviki and returning 
later to recapture it. In the first case we were doomed to 
lose the city with all our organized forces, and also the bridge 
across the Volga, indispensable to us for further operations 
in the interests of Russia. Painful as the second alternative 
was, we had no other way, and the night of July 7, I ordered 
the evacuation of the city. 

Many women and old men, of the working class as well as of 
the "intellectuals," abandoned the city, fearing Bolshevist 
murder and plunder. Most of the working population followed 
our troops and also deserted the city. Our troops took up a 
fortified position near Batraki, which is 4 versts, i. e., two and 
a half miles away from the city. On July 8, the Bolshevist 
troops entered the unfortunate city and immediately began to 
plunder it. Women and old men who succeeded in escaping 
told us what happened there. It is easy to imagine with what 
indignation the workingmen and our mobilized soldiers heard 
these terrible stories. They were eager to begin the battle and 
insisted upon an immediate attack. However, the greater part 
of our forces defending Syzran was so exhausted that we had 
to send it away to Samara for a rest. It was soon replaced 
by a battalion of the Fourth Czecho-Slovak Regiment and a 
part of the People's Army under the command of Colonel 
Kapel of the General Staff, at this time already a well-known 
leader of the People's Army. 

Our forces, composed of workingmen and mobilized men of 
Syzran, numbered 2,000. We could not send more than 
1,500 men against the 4,000 Bolshevist troops. In the morning 
of July 10th, our attack began. It was a beautiful spectacle, 
at dawn, to see our men surround the city in a half-circle 
covering a distance of versts and with shouts of "hurrah" 
rush into the bayonet attack. Units of the Mensheviki, rail- 
road-men, mobilized men of the People's Army, volunteers 
and the Czecho-Slovaks all rivalled one another in their ardor 
and bravery. Remaining upright, within a short distance of 
machine-guns and artillery, our men stood the terrible fire 
and did not respond with a single shot. When I asked them 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



19 



why they did not fire, they answered : "Our relatives are there 
and we cannot fire." 

At 9 o'clock in the morning we entered the city. There 
a strange scene met our eyes. In the cartridge cases at 
the front lines we found queer articles: ladies' shoes, hats, 
gramophones, cameras, etc. The large buildings of the city, 
where our headquarters and those of the Bolsheviki had 
been located, had been turned into storage rooms for plun- 
dered articles. Heaps of wearing apparel, underwear, all 
kinds of merchandise, articles of silver and gold were among 
them. The inhabitants related that upon entering the city 
the Bolsheviki had immediately begun devastating stores and 
the residences of the railroad workers and wealthy people. And 
indeed everything was destroyed. At the station we seized a 
trainload of plundered articles. Many of the simple-minded 
workmen who, while sympathizing with us, had remained in 
the city, had been shot. I, personally, saw the original report 
of one of the Bolshevist commanders of the Naval Battalion, 
in which he stated that he would not tolerate the arrest of 
his soldiers for minor offenses at a time when the other 
Bolshevist troops were plundering the city. "If this state of 
affairs continues," he threatened, "I will also lead my troops 
into the city and take part in the plunder." 

The battles of Syzran are representative of the conflict 
between the loyal forces of the people and the hired Bolshevist 
troops. In fact, in the morning of the 10th, workingmen, 
peasants and intellectuals, representing all political parties, 
with the exception of the Bolsheviki, rushed toward the city 
with shouts of "hurrah", while Letts, Chinese, and troops of 
the Red Army were in the city, plundering it. 

Our success in Syzran, as well as our success on 
all other fronts brought up the question : What is to 
be done further? At that time the French military adviser of 
the Czech National Council, Commandant Alphonse Guinet, 
arrived in Samara. At a general meeting of the military leaders 
he declared that in accordance with the plans of the Allies it 
was necessary to continue our conquests on the Volga, to 
create a Volga front and retain it in our hands until the 
Allies approach. And the Allies, according to him, were 



20 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



coming very soon. This corresponded with the plan previously- 
laid down in Moscow by the Allies and Russian organizations, 
in accordance with which a Volga front, extending approxi- 
mately from Kazan to Saratov, and a Northern front near 
Vologda were to be created as soon as possible. 

We were certain we could execute this plan since we knew 
of the landing of Allied troops in Murmansk and Archangel, 
of their battles and movements toward Vologda and of the 
proclamation in Archangel by the American Ambassador, 
Mr. David Francis, in which he called upon the Russian 
people to fight the Bolsheviki, pledging the aid of the Allies. 
Mr. Alphonse Guinet pointed out that in the interests of the 
Allies and Russia itself it was vastly important to hasten the 
occupation of the cities of Simbirsk, Kazan and Saratov. The 
occupation of Simbirsk was of special importance to us also 
because of the fact that there was located our only cartridge 
plant, and we did lack cartridges. 

I cannot help referring here to the great difficulties under 
which and the heroism with which the Czecho-Slovak forces 
and the forces of the People's Army fulfilled their arduous 
tasks. They started, literally, with bare hands. With bare 
hands they obtained first rifles, then cartridges, and having 
both, they secured machine-guns and light artillery, and later 
also heavy artillery. And all this we took away from our 
enemies. Practically all we needed for our military purposes 
we captured from our foe, who greatly surpassed us in man- 
power and equipment. 

The repeated promises of the Allies to help us with an army 
and ammunition had not yet been fulfilled at that time. How- 
ever, our hopes for the arrival of Allied troops, strengthened 
by official statements of the Allies, were so great that we did 
not for a moment doubt their realization. While mobilizing 
forces for the continuation of our struggle, we had in mind 
not only the struggle against the Bolsheviki, but also against 
Germany. This was officially announced to the people. 
At this time we began to form seven divisions of sharp- 
shooters, to fight Germany especially. The staff was or- 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



21 



ganized, and the plan was made, but we lacked ammunition 
for its realization. In fact, we were then helping the 
Allies' cause by detaining a number of prisoners and prevent- 
ing the Germans from sending them to the Western front, 
and by threatening the Germans with the creation of a new 
Eastern front; that was the purpose of our march towards 
Moscow. 

Taking all this into consideration, Colonel Chechek decided 
to capture Simbirsk, and for this purpose ordered the Com- 
mander of the 1st Czech Regiment, Captain Stepanov, 
now Colonel, to send two battalions from Ufa to Simbirsk 
by rail. It must be said that at that time the Bolshevist 
forces in Simbirsk numbered about 7,000 men, but their forces 
were partly disorganized by our successes as well as by the 
attempt of the Bolshevist Commander, Mouraviev, to insti- 
gate an armed revolt against the Soviets. After the assassina- 
tion of Mirbach and the disaster at Syzran, Mouraviev 
had decided to change the front and to bring about an anti- 
Bolshevist revolution in Simbirsk. He did not succeed in 
bringing about the revolution, as he was killed, but the 
Bolshevist forces remained to a certain extent disorganized. 

The battalions of Captain Stepanov moved with unusual 
rapidity, crushing the many Soviet forces stationed along the 
Volga-Bugulminski Railroad. On this road the Bolsheviki 
had two splendid armored trains, one called "Comrade Lenine" 
and the other "Liberty or Death." Captain Stepanov had one 
"armored train" of our own making, i. e., a platform with a 3- 
inch machine-gun which was under the command of Lieuten- 
antKhalyavin. Out of the thirteen shots fired by the latter, 
twelve hit "Comrade Lenine." The Bolshevist train steamed 
away at full speed in the direction of Simbirsk and the Bolshe- 
vist troops fled in panic. Bearing on this flight, there fell into 
our hands interesting notes exchanged between two Bolshevist 
commanders, Captain of the Guard Tugachevsky, stationed in 
Simbirsk, and Sailor Pugachevsky, commanding troops sta- 
tioned near the railroad. "Why don't you send any reinforce- 
ments (here follows a word of abuse not fit to print) ?" asked 



22 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



Sailor Pugachevsky. "How many times did I tell you to 
send it?" "Don't you know," answered the other, addressing 
his comrade in the same abusive manner, "that my rascals are 
all deserting!" The commander of the Bolshevist armored 
trains, Polupanov, reported the following to his chiefs: "All 
our men have deserted, all our machine-guns are out of order, 
all have fled ; I am sick and I am also leaving. — Polupanov." 

In short, on July 21, after five days' movement by train, Cap- 
tain Stepanov approached Simbirsk on the left bank of the 
river, and thus came into possession of the cartridge plant. As is 
well known, Simbirsk, situated on the right bank of the Volga, 
juts out over the left bank, and it was very difficult to 
capture the bridge and the city situated on a mountain. 
Colonel Kapel foresaw these difficulties and after Captain 
Stepanov had left, he proposed to Colonel Chechek the sending 
to Simbirsk of a part of the People's Army from Syzran by 
roads on the right bank of the Volga. The proposition was 
accepted and two battalions of the People's Army with one 
light-artillery platoon and one howitzer platoon left Syzran 
for Simbirsk. This was one of the most wonderful of marches, 
for our troops, in peasant rigs, covered a distance of 130 
versts in five days, leaving behind them, left and right, large 
units of the enemy. It is enough to say that our troops 
numbering only 1,500 passed a unit of 7,000 men under the 
command of the Bolshevik, Guy, operating in the region of 
Cengeley. In the village of Terenoga our men destroyed the 
Bolshevist outposts, and having talked over the telephone 
with the Bolshevist authorities in Simbirsk, continued to 
move toward the city. The Bolsheviki thought they had con- 
versed with their own men. 

In the evening of July 21st, Colonel Kapel was at the gate 
of the city and the battle began. On July 22d, after a terrible 
struggle, the Bolsheviki were driven out of Simbirsk and our 
troops entered triumphantly. Four hours later the Czecho- 
slovaks joined us and the united command of all our troops 
was taken over by the commander of a Czech regiment, Cap- 
tain Stepanov, a Russian by descent, who had formerly been 
an officer in the Russian army. I was entrusted with full 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



23 



authority in Simbirsk, just as previously in Syzran, and the 
whole territory was occupied by the People's Army. 

Simbirsk welcomed us with joy. The wealthy classes 
donated 5,500,000 rubles for the formation of a national army. 
The workingmen of the cartridge factory and other plants 
resolved to support the new Government and to sacrifice a 
certain part of their wages for the funds of the national 
army. In accordance with my orders, the officers formed 
a battalion in six hours, which that same day set out 
for the front. The women of the different classes of the 
population formed a "Women's Aid Society for the People's 
Army" and did all they could to improve its organization. 
Peasants from neighboring villages and towns asked us to 
give them guns and help them organize volunteer units for 
the fight against the Bolsheviki. There we were confronted 
with the same embarrassment that has been our misfortune 
throughout, i. e., we again lacked rifles. 

In Simbirsk we had captured a large quantity of heavy 
and light artillery and stores of supplies. Moreover, we 
were now in possession of a considerable part of the Volga 
region, which extended over 300 versts, or 198 miles, and 
for our transports we had two bridges across the river. 

I wish to point out here that at that time a revolt broke 
out in the city of Volsk and from there spread to the other 
side of the Volga, and all over the region of Nikolayevsk, 
where the peasants formed units and fought the Bolshe- 
viki. The peasants fought most desperately in the parts 
of the counties of Nikolayevsk and Novo-Uzensk which 
are near the Ural region. The population of this most fertile 
section of the Province of Samara, whence Central Russia 
gets most of her bread supplies, rose repeatedly against the 
Soviet authorities, but each time the rebels were mercilessly 
shot down. 

In one instance, in the village of Semenikha, the Red 
Guards shot about a hundred young peasants, and forced 
old men to dig graves for their sons killed in the presence of 
their families. 

As a sequel to the uprising in Volsk, revolts broke out in 



24 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



Petrovsk, Atkarsk and other counties in the Province of 
Saratov. In the meantime we captured the city of Khvalinsk 
and created a new front south of Syzran, which was placed 
in the command of Colonel Makhin of the General Staff, who 
had successfully disorganized the defense of the Bolsheviki 
in Ufa. His detachments consisted exclusively of troops of 
the People's Army and local peasant units. Colonel 
Makhin operated very successfully against the enemy, who 
greatly surpassed us in strength. In Simbirsk we met Captain 
Borde, an officer of the French army, who had just arrived 
from Kazan, having been sent here by General Laverne, the 
French Military Attache in Russia. He informed us of the 
fact that the Allies were approaching Vologda and that it was 
necessary to capture Kazan as soon as possible, in order to 
meet the Allied forces by way of Viatka. He said that the 
Allied forces would move from Vologda to Viatka. I sent 
him in an aeroplane to Samara to our Commander-in-Chief, 
General Chechek, who, after the conference with Captain 
Borde, gave his permission to attempt the capture of Kazan. 

Ill 

Our decision to take Kazan was also prompted by other 
reasons. Russia's entire gold reserve was in Kazan. 
Part of it was supposed to be handed over to Germany, in 
accordance with the Brest-Litovsk treaty. The Bolsheviki 
also had there an immense quantity of ammunition, artillery 
and food supplies, which had been sent to Kazan after the 
evacuation of several fronts. In Kazan there was also a body 
of officers who had organized to rise against the Bolsheviki. 
Many of their number had been shot by the Bolsheviki. More- 
over, Kazan is a large political centre of Russia and the main 
city in the Volga region. Here were concentrated the main 
Bolshevist forces. From here Bolshevist punitive expeditions 
were sent all over Russia. Not far from Kazan, along the 
Kama River, is the most fertile part of the country. On 
account of the revolts in the counties of Nikolayevsk and 
Novo-Uzensk, the Soviet authorities had been getting their 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



25 



supplies from the county of Chistopol and other counties 
along the Kama River. Besides, we feared that the right 
wing of the Socialists-Revolutionists and the officers of Kazan 
might revolt prematurely and expose the city to the merciless 
terror of the Bolsheviki. We had previously had this ex- 
perience in the cities of Yaroslavl and Murom. 

Just at this time, the Allied armies being at Vologda, the 
Allies advised the officers' organizations to revolt simul- 
taneously against the Bolsheviki in Ribinsk, Vladimir, Yaros- 
lavl and Murom, so as to encircle Moscow as with an iron 
ring. The revolts in Rubinsk and Vladimir failed. Those 
in Yaroslavl and Murom were successful. The uprising in 
Yaroslavl was directed by Col. Perkhurov, and in Murom 
by Dr. N. The city of Yaroslavl held out for 15 days. 

In Yaroslavl it was again our misfortune that we had not 
enough rifles and no artillery at all. As the aid pledged us by 
the Allies did not come, the city fell, battered by the heavy 
artillery of the Bolsheviki. The Bolshevist press itself admit- 
ted that Yaroslavl presented a terrible sight. It was in ruins, 
with heaps of dead bodies in the streets and in destroyed 
buildings. Naturally, the population blamed the Allies who 
had failed to lend a helping hand. This experience was a 
frightful one and we decided to use our organized forces to 
seize Kazan at any price, and if possible advance towards 
Nisjni-Novgorod, where the workmen of Sormovo were wait- 
ing for us. Later, if circumstances permitted, we figured to 
set out for Moscow. The political situation indicated clearly 
that a delay was dangerous, that any delay would affect 
us more than anything else. As I have said before, help from 
the Allies failed to come and our resources were very limited 
while those of the Bolsheviki were plentiful, the Germans 
rendering them substantial aid. Every day's delay meant 
new gains for them. 

The Bolsheviki, having enormous sums of money at 
their disposal, could, with the aid of the Germans, organize 
their armed forces. Therefore, it was necessary to capture, 
as soon as possible, the centre of their political activities, 
Moscow, from which their influence spread, and where all 



26 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



their means were concentrated. The occupation of Moscow 
would have been a tremendous spur for revolts all over Russia, 
which has long been ready to rise against the Bolsheviki, but 
has been kept in terror by the Bolshevist forces, which have 
been well organized just because Moscow and Petrograd are 
in their hands. Another reason why it was necessary to occupy 
these centres as soon as possible and overthrow the Bolshevist 
power, was the fact that the Soviets at that time began their 
wholesale destruction of Russia's best intellectual forces. 

Dora Kaplan's attempt on Lenine's life and the assassination 
of Uritzky, in Petrograd, was followed by the Bolshevist 
terror. The prisons were filled with thousands of suspected 
persons, mainly Russian intellectuals belonging to the Consti- 
tutional-Democratic Party and the Party of Socialists-Revolu- 
tionists. The mere honor of being a "Member of the Con- 
stituent Assembly" meant a death sentence for the one who 
possessed it. To be a member of a party which did not recog- 
nize the Soviets was considered a crime. The suspected were 
shot down by order of the Bolsheviki, without trial. After the 
attempt on Lenine's life all the local Soviets received tele- 
graphic instructions from Petrograd to show no indulgence 
and to let terror reign. They were further ordered to report to 
the authorities in Moscow to what extent they carried out 
these instructions. As a result, the Soviets of many provincial 
cities had many suspected persons shot. Often fifty, or more, 
at a time, were murdered without legal proceedings. 

To officers the Soviets paid special attention. In Moscow 
15,000 officers were arrested. Of these, 10,000 are still in 
prison, according to information received from Moscow.. We 
heard that after the attempt to assassinate Lenine, 1,500 
people were shot down. In the Bolshevist papers, which 
we got in various ways, we saw long lists of those 
shot down in different cities of Russia. In the villages 
Bolshevist terror reigned even more blindly. In addition, in 
Petrograd, Moscow, and all over Central Russia the better 
democratic elements were perishing from starvation. The 
people were impatiently waiting for deliverance, turning their 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



27 



eyes to the Volga and Murmansk, for they knew of the 
solemn promise of the Allies to help democratic Russia. 

At that very time we captured Ekaterinburg. Gen. Gaida, 
leading the Czecho-Slovaks, broke through Siberia and drove 
out the Bolsheviki. The troops of Gen. Gaida joined our 
troops operating in Eastern Siberia, and it was officially an- 
nounced to the Czechs that instead of the rear-guard, they had 
now become a van-guard of the Allies. 

These circumstances prompted us to realize our original 
plan, worked out in accord with the Allies, as soon as possible. 
This was to take Kazan and to continue our march toward 
Nisjni-Novgorod, on the one hand, and toward Viatka, on 
the other, to join the Allies and rapidly crush the Soviet 
power. This conviction was so strong in us that when Gen. 
Chehek on account of changes on the Southern front, near 
Samara, suddenly changed his decision and ordered the troops 
on the way to Kazan to return, our men continued the march, 
and in spite of the order Kazan was taken. 

The advance on Kazan must be noted down as a remarkable 
act of heroism. We quickly organized a heavy artillery in 
Simbirsk. Several 6-inch machine-guns and 42-calibre 
Schneider cannons were put on barges. A few additional 
armored tows were built. In the morning of August 1, two bat- 
talions of the Czechs and one battalion of the People's Army 
embarked under the command of Colonel Kapel, and the 
whole squadron, consisting of 21 ships, started up the Volga 
River. We left behind a part of the People's Army and a 
Siberian battalion of volunteers for the struggle with the 
strong enemy moving towards Simbirsk. The distance be- 
tween Simbirsk and Kazan is 250 versts, i. e., 165 miles, and 
that between Samara and Kazan about 150 versts, or 99 
miles. We proceeded up the river with the same speed 
with which we had moved towards Simbirsk and Ufa. You 
must bear in mind that 8,000 men of the Soviet army were 
then stationed in Kazan. Most of these were Letts under 
the command of General Vatzeitis, the Commander of the 
Bolshevist forces who had replaced Colonel Mouraviev. 
Vatzeitis was an officer in active service, a graduate of the 



28 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



Academy of the General Staff, and one of the most prominent 
generals in the Soviet army. 

Just as in the case of our movement toward Simbirsk, we 
moved up the river successfully despite the numerous units of 
the enemy's forces on the right and left banks of the Volga. 
We paid no attention to what was happening around us and 
behind us. We were, so to say, hypnotized by the one idea, 
the capture of Kazan. 

In the evening of August 5th, our squadron was in sight of 
the city. The Bolsheviki had not expected such boldness on 
our part and had taken no precautions. Our battle squadron, 
led by Midshipman Meerer, passed the piers of Kazan, 
attacked the Bolshevist armed squadron under the command 
of the Commissary of Naval Affairs, the notorious Raskol- 
nikov, and chasing it, continued its movement up the Volga 
for 15 versts, i. e., 9.9 miles beyond the city. Unfortunately, 
17 versts, or 11.22 miles from the city we were detained by 
disembarking two companies of our infantry, a squadron of 
our cavalry and a battery, which were detailed to attack the 
strong Bolshevist positions on the upper slope of the right 
bank. After that we were to continue our march towards 
Sviajsk in order to destroy the railroad behind the moving 
Bolshevist forces. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviki succeeded in 
dispatching to the piers of Kazan light artillery, machine-guns 
and cannons. It was thus impossible to approach the piers. 
Our warships had to return under the enemy's heavy fire, and 
we decided to delay our operations until the morning of the 
6th. 

In the morning of the 6th, our detachment disembarked on 
the marshy left bank of the Volga. It was therefore unable 
to take along any artillery. We moved towards the city of 
Kazan. Our detachment consisted of three companies of the 
People's Army under the command of Colonel Kapel, and 
only four companies of Czecho-Slovaks, as two of the Czecho- 
slovak companies were left on the right bank of the river and 
one in the village of Epanchino, at the mouth of the Kama 
River. The Czecho-Slovak forces of our detachment were to 
enter the city from the southern side and the People's Army 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



29 



from the eastern side. The Czecho-Slovak forces were under 
the command of Colonel Shvets. Colonel Stepanov was in 
charge of the whole operation. I was attached to the division 
with special authority, having the same power as in Syzran 
and Simbirsk. 

The villages on our way to Kazan we could take only by 
desperate fighting. During the night the Bolsheviki succeeded 
in bringing out a large quantity of machine-guns and artillery 
for the defense of the city. We had no artillery but one 37- 
millimetre gun in the possession of the Czecho-Slovaks. 
At one o'clock in the afternoon, the detachment with 
Colonel Kapel at the head entered Kazan from the eastern 
side. The rest of the troops did not know this. Amidst hard 
fighting, the Czecho-Slovak forces succeeded in advancing to- 
wards the piers and the city. It seemed impossible for this 
insignificant number of men to take such a large city as 
Kazan, which spread before us on a vast plain and was de- 
fended by a foe who greatly surpassed us in strength and had 
an enormous quantity of artillery, machine-guns, cannons and 
armored trains. 

In the most critical moment of the battle new troops ap- 
peared on the left flank of the Czechs. These were 300 Serbs 
who had come from Booinsk under the command of the 
Servian Major, Blagotich. The history of these Serbs is 
truly wonderful. They reached Kazan a few days before 
our offensive began, as a neutral force not hostile to the 
Soviet authorities. Nevertheless, fearing that the arrival 
of the Serbs might prove disastrous to them, the Bolshe- 
viki planned at first to capture their officers, and in case 
of failure, to disarm the soldiers. The Serbs, however, 
understood the plans of the Bolsheviki and secretly left for 
Booinsk, which we had captured by that time. Here they 
learned that we were on the way to Kazan. When it was 
suggested that they go to Samara and join the other Servian 
units there, they answered: "First we will capture Kazan 
and then we shall go where we please." They were given a 
ship and together with a Czech unit, stationed in Booinsk, 
they joined us in the most critical moment of the battle. 



30 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



The Serbs acted heroically. They set out directly for the 
piers, and I myself, participating in the struggle, was an eye- 
witness of their mad attack on the Bolshevist machine-guns, 
cannons and armed automobiles on the piers. Armed with 
rifles only, they attacked the strongest positions of the enemy 
despite the Bolsheviki's heavy firing from light and heavy 
artillery. The Serbs succeeded in capturing weapons, which 
they immediately used against the fleeing enemy, on whose 
heels they followed. The other divisions of the detachment of 
the People's Army and the Czecho-Slovaks fought in exactly 
the same manner. 

In the evening a storm broke out. Notwithstanding the 
heavy rain, accompanied by thunder and lightning, our small 
detachments entered the city from three sides. They chose 
this form of occupation because those units of the People's 
Army that had entered the city at one o'clock in the afternoon 
had been forced to retreat and were then withdrawing. The 
People's Army entered the city from the east, the Czecho- 
slovaks from the south and the Serbs from the piers. The 
fortress was immediately captured, and the Serbs brought in 
a whole regiment of Letts who had surrendered at once. A 
band playing the Marseillaise led the regiment. The battle in 
the streets of the city lasted throughout the night of August 6 
and came to a close only at noon on August 7, when Kazan 
with its enormous supplies and tremendous influence came 
into our hands. 

Here we took 30,000 poods (1,080,000 pounds) of gold, 100,- 
000,000 rubles in paper money, all the platinum that was in 
the Russian banks, a great quantity of silver and an enormous 
sum in securities, which had been brought here from all the 
principal banks of Russia. All this I immediately forwarded 
to Samara and thence to Omsk. Moreover, we also captured 
a great amount of heavy and light artillery and a great quan- 
tity of food supplies. But more important to us than all this 
was the great enthusiasm with which the population wel- 
comed us. 

The magic words "On to Moscow" roused in the people a 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



31 



belief in the future of Russia, called forth their noblest senti- 
ments and a manifestation of joy and patriotism. It is enough 
to say that after the capture of Kazan there were uprisings 
in the cities and counties of Chistopol, Laishev, Spass, Tzare- 
vokokshaisk, Urzhumsk, Nolinsk and in severa! southern 
counties of the Province of Viatka. Peasant uprisings against 
the Bolsheviki spread over a vast territory. Whole detach- 
ments as well as individuals of the Red Army were killed by 
the peasants. Villages and entire counties sent delegations 
asking us to help them, mainly with rifles for the purpose of 
organizing local units of the People's Army. Unfortunately, 
we had found in Kazan anything but rifles. We sent repre- 
sentatives of the new Government and commanders to all 
the cities and counties. Most of these cities had successfully 
mobilized their youths born in 1897 and 1898. We could not, 
however, equip the recruits with arms. In spite of it, we 
continued the mobilization in the hope that help would soon 
come from the Allies. 

At the same time 20,000 workingmen of Izhevsk revolted 
against the Soviets. They had a few cannons, and together 
with the peasants and former soldiers they organized more 
than 100 units for the struggle against the Bolsheviki. These 
volunteer units captured the cities of Sarapul and Elabuga, 
the Votinski plant, and proceeded towards Perm. They kept 
on fighting for about three months, until, according to the 
latest Russian newspaper reports that reached us in Novem- 
ber, they were surrounded by the Bolsheviki and had to yield 
for lack of reinforcements. Their fate was horrible indeed. 

The population of Kazan received us with great joy. Dur- 
ing the 34 days we remained in the city services were held in 
all the churches, synagogues and mosques. The railroad- 
workers formed units to fight the Bolsheviki. The university 
joined us. The Municipality and Zemstvo actively partici- 
pated in the defense of the city, in the work of organization 
and in the propaganda for the formation of a National Army. 
The account of the People's Army Fund, which I opened 
at the State Bank, in a few days amounted to 8,000,000 rubles. 



32 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



The donations of the people varied from one to 400,000 rubles. 
Articles of gold and silver were brought to us. Wherever pos- 
sible collections were made. The campaign day of the 
People's Army was very successful. Just as in Simbirsk, the 
women r ' Kazan formed a "Women's Aid Society for the 
People's Army," and the day after its formation you could 
see them scrubbing the barracks and establishing canteens in 
the city and at the front, both for soldiers and civilians. 
The wealthy classes of the population voluntarily contributed 
30,000,000 rubles. 

I informed the Mohammedan population of our need of 
cavalry, and within 24 hours a squadron was formed. Stu- 
dents ardently answered the call to the colors and together 
with the enlightened workingmen formed volunteer units. The 
officers organized in four training battalions and later fought 
as plain soldiers. A powerful artillery was created. The 
Bolsheviki had several times mobilized the horses in Kazan, 
thus there was only a small number left. However, when I 
applied at the City Council for horses, 1,500 horses were 
brought to us the next morning. Peasants of the neighboring 
villages also offered us their horses. Even those who had only 
two gave one to the People's Army. 

At that time the position of the Soviets was critical. The 
news of our success reached Moscow and Nisjni-Novgorod 
was evacuated. We heard that trenches were being dug 
around Moscow and that the Bolshevist Commissaries were 
discussing their resignation. In Moscow were stationed only 
two Chinese and one "international" battalion. The rest of 
the Bolshevist forces had been sent to the Volga front. The 
population waited impatiently for us, and if only the promised 
aid had come, or if we had had only two more regiments, 
we would have advanced on Nisjni-Novgorod and the en- 
tire situation would have been different. But we had no 
reserves. As a matter of fact, we had been fighting one against 
five, and often one against ten. Moreover, when Kazan was 
taken, in the evening of the 8th, we had to send Colonel 
Kapel and all our units of the People's Army to Simbirsk, 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



33 



where numerous hordes of the Bolsheviki were bearing down 
on the city. It was no easy task that fell to the lot of 
Colonel Kapel. However, he fulfilled it successfully. Two of 
the enemy's regiments were entirely destroyed and the whole 
Soviet army completely defeated. 

The Bolsheviki right near Kazan had been forced to with- 
draw to the Romanov bridge. However, reinforcements came 
and they again took up their operations against us. Now, 
if we had had a reserve army we could easily have overcome 
them and then proceeded further, because, as I have said 
before, at that moment the Bolsheviki had concentrated all 
their forces at the Volga, mainly near Kazan, and a decisive 
victory at Kazan would have cleared the way for us right 
into the interior. Not having any reserves, we were on the 
defensive instead of the offensive. This, of course, was greatly 
to our disadvantage, because each day's delay on our part 
gave the Bolsheviki the opportunity to strengthen their forces. 
With large sums of money at their disposal, they could offer 
high salaries and, thus, easily find mercenaries. Besides, 
urged by Trotzky, the Soviet authorities had concluded a 
formal treaty with Germany. Thus they were able to trans- 
fer all their forces of about 150,000 men from the Ukraine 
and the German front to the Volga. 

I am not referring here only to the time of the taking of 
Kazan. The transfer of troops had begun earlier, but was 
carried out fully after Kazan was taken. Moreover, Wilhelm 
had issued an order instructing German war-prisoners to help 
the Soviet powers, which were at war with the Allies. The 
Bolsheviki began to clear their staff of officers who sympathized 
with us. The assistance of the German General Staff was 
now greater than ever before. According to reliable sources 
of information, part of a division of war-prisoners, formed to 
be sent to the Western front, was sent by Germany from 
Orsha to Kazan. As I have said before, each day's delay 
was a disadvantage to us and a help to the foe. We had 
men, but we lacked ammunition. Neither had we the financial 
or technical means for quick organization that the Bolsheviki 



34 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



had. It was also a great advantage to them that the whole 
machinery of State was in their hands. 

No matter how things stood, we were fully convinced that 
the Allies would come to our assistance. That is the reason 
we continued to work for the general cause, holding the large 
Volga front extending from Kazan to Khvaluinsk, despite the 
small number of our men. If we had only known that the 
50,000 Japanese and American soldiers who disembarked at 
Vladivostok did not intend to come to our help in the imme- 
diate future and that the holding of our front would be left to 
us and the Czechs, it is quite possible that instead of trying to 
open a way to Vladivostok and to build a front 7,000 versts 
long and 500 versts wide, we would have concentrated our 
forces on the Volga front and moved on to Moscow right 
after the capture of Kazan, in July or August. The fate of 
Russia would have been a different one, for with the fall of 
Moscow the Soviet power would have disappeared. We 
would have had enough troops for the advance on Moscow if 
we had not had to defend the Volga front while awaiting the 
arrival of the Allies. 

Our efforts at Kazan to capture the Romanov bridge and 
to completely defeat the Bolshevist forces stationed there, 
represents one of the most heroic moments of the whole 
Volga expedition. In one of the most dreadful battles Major 
Blagotich, one of the deliverers of Kazan, was killed. 

The death of Blagotich, on August 16th, proved fatal for the 
outcome of the battle. Having lost their leader, the Serbs 
retreated and the bridge remained in the hands of the Bolshe- 
viki. At the same time, having received, from us, a false order 
in Trotzky's name, the Bolshevist army, under Blokhin, began 
also to move northward towards Viatka. It had advanced 
to Arsk, where it discovered its mistake and returned. As 
I have said before, large forces were transferred from the Ger- 
man front to Kazan, and the city soon found itself in a state of 
siege. Judging by the official report of the Bolsheviki, which 
announced that 12,000 men were killed in the battle of Kazan, 
you can imagine how fierce a battle that was. Of course, 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



35 



compared with the casualties in the present war, the number 
killed at Kazan is insignificant, but if you bear in mind that 
after our departure we left only a force of 3,000 men, you 
will realize what a dreadful and heroic fight that was. 

IV 

At the end of August we made the last attempt to crush the 
enemy. With great effort we succeeded in bringing together a 
number of men, about enough for a regiment of the People's 
Army. It is true that of this number we formed three regi- 
ments. They were, however, still in training and in reality 
equaled only one regiment. This regiment was supplemented 
by a squadron with heavy and light batteries under Lieu- 
tenant Feldman. The detachment under the command of 
Colonel Kapel, formed in Simbirsk and Samara, moved up the 
Volga, disembarked in the village of Tashevka, on the right 
bank of the river, and tried to outflank the rear forces of the 
enemy. This all-around movement took about two days, and 
finally we reached the village of Goviadina, where the train 
that had brought Trotzky and the commander-in-chief, Vat- 
zeitis, was waiting. I must say that the Soviets attached great 
importance to the capture of Kazan. This can be seen from 
the fact that Trotzky, Kobosev and 200 members of the Cen- 
tral Executive Committee were all dispatched to this city. 
Lenine himself also came to Sviarsk. Unfortunately, we ar- 
rived at Goviadina in the evening and hesitated to begin the 
battle during the night. 

The Bolsheviki suspected nothing, though in the rear of 
them the station at Turlema had been blown up by the detach- 
ment under Lieutenant Feldman, which had a mounted bat- 
tery. The first discharge of our mounted battery blew up a 
Bolshevist train and the station. In spite of it, we saw no sign 
of the enemy near Sviarsk and we took up quarters only four 
versts from the railroad station. The Bolsheviki suspected 
our presence so little that at night twelve volunteers and I 
went twice to the railroad station and succeeded in blowing 



36 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



up the rails and capturing two armored trains, which we 
later destroyed. 

In the morning we began the offensive. The Bolsheviki fled 
in all directions and our victory seemed near when a transport 
of Lettish troops arrived from the other side of the Volga 
and struck a blow at our flank. We had no reserves and had 
to retreat in spite of the fact that we had almost been vic- 
torious. This was our last effort to destroy the Bolshevist 
military center which had formed around Kazan. We had 
tried to attack the enemy from another side, but the Bolshe- 
viki opposed us with a large detachment of Letts, under good 
leadership and well supplied with machine-guns and artillery. 
Our attempt was thus fruitless. 

At that time I was recalled to Samara by the Govern- 
ment, which sent me as its representative to the Conference 
in Ufa. Therefore, the rest of the story is no longer that of an 
eye-witness, but of one who has gathered his material from 
official statements and the reports of eye-witnesses. 

September 10, we, the small number of exhausted defenders, 
gave up Kazan. Our recruits were sent to the rear-lines. 
We carried away with us everything possible. Together 
with the troops, 30,000 of the population left the city fearing 
the revenge of the Bolsheviki. Our troops were so exhausted 
that in the eyes of some, the Czechs, for instance, I could 
clearly read the insanity that comes with extreme over- 
exhaustion. 

If we take into consideration that these men, as well as our 
men of the People's Army, had fought on different fronts for 
three months without relief, we can understand that only 
inspiration and unusual enthusiasm could have made them 
hold out at Kazan for 34 days and nights against an enemy 
outnumbering them five to one. Moreover, their sacrifices 
in men were heavy. Those of the enemy, however, were four- 
fold as heavy. 

While waiting for the Allied help, our brave troops fought 
according to the plan laid down by us together with the Allies, 
at the same time encouraging the people, telling them of the 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



37 



expected help. Despite all their courage and bravery, they 
finally had to retreat. I would not be surprised but that this 
retreat was the cause of the suicide of Colonel Shvets of the 
1st Czech Regiment, about which I heard later at the Russian 
Embassy in Washington. At the same time our forces also 
had to withdraw from Simbirsk, where Colonel Kapel did 
everything in human power to defend the city against the 
outnumbering enemy. We had to retreat because we did not 
receive the help the Allies promised us. The Bolsheviki suc- 
ceeded because Germany kept her word and gave them the 
help she had promised. 

Soon afterward, in the beginning of October, we had to 
evacuate Syzran, and thus the Volga front was broken up. 
Our troops were also forced to leave Samara. I do not 
know what happened in the regions reoccupied by the 
enemy, where the population had gladly responded to our 
call, had welcomed us with joy and had helped us in what- 
ever way it could. Its fate, no doubt, is miserable. All we 
know is that on the day of their occupation of Kazan, the 
Bolsheviki were shooting down the people in masses and that 
the wild orgy continued for several days. It is said that 
the German officers tried to calm the enraged Bolsheviki 
and stop their brutalities. No doubt, if the intellectuals and 
all those people who sympathized with us had not left the 
city with our troops, the Bolsheviki would have displayed 
still greater ferocity. Of their state of mind you can judge 
by the fact that last winter they wanted to turn the Uni- 
versity of Kazan into a bath. Their ground for this was 
the fact that the baths in Kazan were out of order and the 
university, they claimed, was utilized only by the bourgeoisie. 

If the Bolsheviki continue being successful in their offensive, 
the fate of the Ural and Orenburg Cossacks will be a terrible 
one as they have from the very beginning fought the Bolshe- 
viki. The Cossacks are very much attached to their home- 
steads and neither the soldiers nor the peasants would aban- 
don their towns and villages, and consequently they will be 
slain. As for the Orenburg Cossacks, they experienced the 



38 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



Bolshevist revenge when armored trains passing the Cossack 
villages devastated them and practically wiped them out. 
I do not know what became of the workingmen of Izhevsk 
who for three months fought bravely against the Bolsheviki 
in the hope that help might soon come. 

In any case, this movement against the Bolsheviki, closely 
connected with our struggle against Germany, shows clearly 
what superhuman efforts have been made by crushed, hu- 
miliated and helpless Russia. In May, 1918, her resurrection 
began, expressing itself not only in words but in a series of 
heroic deeds. The gathering of the Russian population 
around the Czechs on the vast territory stretching from the 
Volga to Vladivostok shows that the Russian people under- 
stand the Bolshevist demagogy and treachery camouflaged 
by democratic phraseology. If the struggle of the Russian 
people had been supported by the Allies, as was promised, 
Russia, without question, would have participated in the war 
with Germany till the very end, and would not at present be 
in the position of a modest petitioner, but that of an Ally, on 
an equal footing with the other great countries. Even now 
she has every right to consider herself an Ally, for her great 
sacrifices during the first three years of the war and the great 
services rendered by her have helped the Allies to bring this 
struggle to a victorious end. 

We may truthfully say that in the liberated regions of 
Russia Bolshevism has ceased to exist. Only an insignificant 
minority of workingmen still clings to it secretly. And this 
can be understood. The ideology of Bolshevism has long 
been cast aside by the workingmen themselves at all labor 
conferences and by the Socialistic parties, which lead the 
labor movement in Russia. The present-day Bolshevism pre- 
serves its power only by the fact that while pretending to 
benefit the working class, it gives the small minority which 
supports it the privilege of idleness, high salaries and other 
advantages of the leisure class. Having printing-presses at 
their disposal, the Bolsheviki issue enough paper money to 
be able to bribe their supporters as well as their soldiers. 



Against the Bolshevist Tyranny 



39 



If they retain the facilities for making money and remain 
in possession of the two great centers of political influence, 
Moscow and Petrograd, with the whole machinery of State 
at their disposal ; if they continue to rule over a considerable 
territory where the helpless and hungry population is terror- 
ized by the Red Army, the Bolshevist elements may extend 
their influence even into parts of the territory occupied by 
their opponents. Such was the case in Kazan and Simbirsk. 
In Simbirsk, for instance, the majority of the workingmen of 
the cartridge plant and their leaders followed us when our 
troops left the city; the minority, however, went over to the 
side of the Bolsheviki. It is necessary to do away with this 
state of affairs for the sake of the labor class itself. Petrograd 
and Moscow must be rescued and the misled workingmen 
instructed that the Soviet regime no longer exists and that it 
is time to stop idling and return to work. Any further delay 
is dangerous for Russia. In any case, Bolshevism cannot last 
much longer; it has lost the support and sympathy of the 
people and its power is now based on terror only, which 
grows wilder from day to day. We see with what rapidity 
and cruelty the economic and moral life of a great nation 
is being ruined. Everything that is best in that country is 
being literally killed, and the very soul of the people tor- 
mented. 

As for our attitude towards the Allies, I wish to emphasize 
once more the fact that Russia in warring against the Bolshe- 
viki considered herself at war with Germany. She has clearly 
stated that she does not recognize the Brest-Litovsk treaty 
and did organize her army for the struggle against Germany. 
It is not our fault that we had to fight only the German war- 
prisoners and not the German troops on the Russian-German 
front. We have done all we could to reach the latter. In 
view of the fact that there are at present two fronts in Russia, 
the Allies' Northern and the Volga front, where many of 
the Bolshevist forces are concentrated, an attack from the 
South would successfully solve the problem of establishing 
a real democracy in Russia. For this purpose it would be 



40 



The Russian Democracy in its Struggle 



sufficient to send 60,000 men to Odessa ; thence, together with 
the Russian forces organized in the South, which, according 
to newspaper reports, have captured Kiev, they could move 
on to Moscow. 

Our struggle over the whole distance from Samara to Vladi- 
vostok has been conducted mostly along water routes and 
railway lines. The same thing will happen now. Therefore, 
not a moment should be lost and troops should be 
sent to Russia quickly, perhaps from the Saloniki front 
which, due to the armistice, is entirely free of Germans. The 
fact that Germany has quit the war cannot change the decision 
of the Allies, for the Bolsheviki and the Germans were united 
in their actions against us and the Allies. If one of our 
enemies has quit the war, it does not mean that we have to 
change our attitude towards the other, as long as he continues 
to fight. Moreover, it is necessary to send some of the 
American forces stationed in Vladivostok to the Volga front 
in order that the Russian people may feel American 
sympathy, for it wonders how the great American democracy 
can leave the better part of the Russian people, of the 
Russian democracy, to its fate, how the Americans in Vladi- 
vostok can calmly see the Russian people perish even though 
they revolted against the Bolsheviki upon the admonition 
of the American Ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis. 
It is necessary for the United States to assist us on our front 
with all we need, with equipment, ammunition and supplies, 
not only for the Russian army at the front, but also for the 
recruits who have been called but on account of lack of arms 
have not been able to participate in the struggle. 



George Kennan, in the "Outlook" 
of February 5, 1919, says: 



"One of the most interesting and 
instructive documents that have re- 
cently come from Russia is the account 
by Colonel Vladimir I. Lebedeff of the 
heroic fight made last summer against 
the Bolsheviki in the upper part of the 
Volga -River basin by the Czecho- 
slovaks and the patriotic people of 
eastern Russia. The document is in- 
teresting and instructive, not only be- 
cause it furnishes accurate and trust- 
worthy information v/ith regard to the 
Bolsheviki and the attitude of the Rus- 
sian people toward them, but because 
it shows that with a very little help 
from the Allies — even a few regiments, 
with a supply of arms and ammunition 
— the Czechoslovaks and the so-called 
"People's Army" of eastern Russia 
would probably have taken Moscow 
and ended the rule of the Bolsheviki as 
long ago as last August." 



